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A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO RECORD
THE POLICE
GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS
JOHN A. STEAKLEY
I. INTRODUCTION
Do citizens have a right to record the actions of law enforcement
officers? This topic has been the subject of considerable discussion, and
no small degree of litigation, in recent years.1 The increase in litigation is
driven by dramatic improvements in camera technology, which allow
individuals to record and share images in ways that were previously
available, if at all, only to members of large media organizations.2
Most of the discussion and litigation has revolved around the question
of whether there is a First Amendment right to record police officers in
public. In the recent First Circuit case of Glik v. Cunniffe,3 for example,
passerby Simon Glik caught sight of three police officers arresting a young
man. Hearing a passerby shout that the officers were hurting the man, Glik
turned on his cell phone and began capturing video. The police officers
objected to being recorded, arrested Glik and charged him with violating
the state’s   “wiretap”   law   by   recording   them   without   their   consent,4 and
seized his camera and memory chip in the process as evidence. The First
Circuit held  that  the  right  to  record  police  officers  in  public  is  a  “clearly  
established”   part   of the First Amendment’s protections, and held the
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.5
 Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. J.D. (1985),
Yale Law School; B.A. (1982), University of Tennessee. Thanks to Richard Casada for excellent
research assistance.
 J.D. (1996), University of Tennessee. Practicing criminal defense law in Marietta, Georgia at
John A. Steakley, PC.
1. See Morgan Leigh Manning, Less than Picture Perfect: The Legal Relationship between
Photographers’ Rights and Law Enforcement, 78 TENN. L. REV. 105 (2010) (surveying case law
regarding the arrest and prosecution of photographers for taking photos and recording video of law
enforcement officers in public places).
2. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Watching The Watchers: Why Surveillance Is A Two-Way
Street, POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/
4237005 (describing growth of ubiquitous, low-cost photo and video technology and its impact on
citizen newsgathering).
3. 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
4. This is a common, if rarely successful, gambit used by law enforcement to halt or punish
those recording them. See Reynolds, supra note 2.
5. Glik, 655 F.3d at 85–88.

1

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2043907
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2043907

2

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89:###

Though the issue has not yet reached the Supreme Court, it seems safe
to say that the case for First Amendment protection regarding photos and
video of law enforcement officers in public is quite strong, and is in the
process of being resolved. This Essay, however, argues that independent
of any First Amendment right, there is also a due process right to record
the actions of law enforcement, and that this right applies even when the
interaction takes place in private, and not in public places. This question of
a due process right to record the police has not yet produced the degree of
attention and litigation that public recording has, but the growth of
inexpensive recording equipment and its inclusion in smart phones ensures
that such attention and litigation are sure to be forthcoming.
A. The Public-Private Distinction
It is not entirely clear that the First Amendment right to record police
officers applies only in public. Just   as   the   “plain   view”   exception   to   the  
Fourth Amendment empowers police officers to make arrests based on
objects or behavior they see in the privacy of citizens’ homes, it is entirely
possible that the First Amendment entitles citizens to record police
officers’ actions whenever citizens are present. Most of the leading cases
to date, however, have involved public places, and that has been stressed
in the opinions and discussion. In Glik, for example, the First Circuit noted
that the  arrest  took  place  in  Boston  Common,  “the  oldest  city  park  in  the  
United States and the apotheosis of a public forum. In such traditional
spaces,”  the  court  continued,  “the  rights  of  the  state  to  limit  the  exercise  of  
First Amendment activity are ‘sharply circumscribed.’”6
While citizen journalism may record misconduct—or the lack
thereof—where police act in public parks and similar locations, the very
public character of those places means that there will likely be other
witnesses. But what of the interaction of citizens and police officers in
places where there is no one else present?
Such interactions may well be newsworthy enough to justify First
Amendment protection, but they may also raise due process concerns.
When officers act improperly in the presence of witnesses, after all, they
may still enjoy a testimonial advantage, as courts and juries are
notoriously willing to believe even doubtful police testimony. But when
there is no third party present, the question is presented more strongly. A
recent case from Chicago serves to illustrate the point.
6. Id. at 84.
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Tiawanda Moore made a sexual harassment complaint against a
Chicago patrol officer. When visited by police Internal Affairs officers
who tried to persuade her to drop the charge, she recorded the audio using
her Blackberry. Though the audio reflected rather poorly on the Internal
Affairs officers, the response of the Chicago state’s attorney was to act not
against the officers, but against Ms. Moore, charging her with
“wiretapping.”
Moore was acquitted after the jury heard the recording:
Her attorney, Robert W. Johnson, argued that Moore believed that
the internal affairs investigators, Sgt. Richard Plotke and Officer
Luis Alejo, were dragging their feet on her complaint, which could
be construed as official misconduct, a criminal charge.
“The plan was to kill this complaint from the very beginning,”
Johnson told jurors Wednesday in his closing argument. “They were
stalling, they were intimidating her and they were bullying her into
not making that complaint.”
In the recording, which the one juror said was replayed several
times in the jury room, Alejo was heard explaining to Moore that
she might be wasting her time because it was basically her word
against that of the patrol officer. Alejo also said they could “almost
guarantee” that the officer would never bother her again if she
dropped the complaint.
“When we heard that, everyone (on the jury) just shook their head,”
juror Adams said in a telephone interview. “If what those two
investigators were doing wasn't criminal, we felt it bordered on
criminal, and she had the right to record it.”
Moore alleged that the patrol officer who answered the domestic
disturbance call at her home had fondled her and given her his
personal phone number.7

7. Jason Meisner & Ryan Haggerty, Woman Who Recorded Cops Acquitted of Felony
Eavesdropping Charges, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-08-25/
news/ct-met-eavesdropping-trial-0825-20110825_1_eavesdropping-law-police-officers-law-enforcement.
For a more recent instance where private  recording  played  a  similar  role  in  protecting  an  indvidual’s  
rights, see Douglas Stanglin, Cops In A Jam After Cell Tape Contradicts Arrest Report, USA TODAY
ONDEADLINE BLOG, Mar. 28, 2012, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ ondeadline/post/2012/03/
cops-in-a-jam-after-cell-tape-contradicts-arrest-report--/1 (“The audiotape depicts a starkly different
scene from what officers Nicole Stasnek and Derek Fernandes declared in their official reports and
told  the  court  under  oath.”).
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Moore, when the Internal Affairs officers spoke with her, was not
under investigation—she was the complainant, whom investigators were
trying to persuade to drop the complaint they were supposed to be
investigating. But, there seems no good reason why she should have been
prosecuted for recording this interaction, and it seems quite likely that a
jury would not have believed her testimony about the Internal Affairs
officers’ behavior,   which   was   indeed   almost   “incredible,”   without   such  
evidence.
B. Legal Self-Defense
Of course, for citizens speaking with federal investigators, a possible
False Statements Act prosecution makes self-defensive recording even
more important. Under the False Statements Act, codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001,
. . . [W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the
United States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same
to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or,
if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as
defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or
both.8
In the absence of a recording, it is the citizen's word against the
investigators’ regarding precisely what is said, and although the due
process clause might not extend so far as requiring that investigators make
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1001. In recent years, numerous high-profile defendants, though found innocent
of the crimes of which they were initially accused, were nonetheless convicted of violating the False
Statement Act. See Solomon Wisenberg, How to Avoid Going to Jail under 18 U.S.C. Section 1001 for
Lying to Government Agents, FINDLAW.COM, http://library.findlaw.com/2004/May/11/147945.html
(describing   such   cases   and   concluding   that   “[t]he   potential   for   abuse   of   this   statute   is   great”) (last
visited Mar. 28, 2012).
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a recording of their conversations, it certainly seems that it might extend
so far as to permit citizens to do so.
So for citizens, recording interactions with police serves two important
purposes regardless of whether those interactions take place in public or in
private. First, it provides a record of potential police misbehavior. Second,
it provides a potentially exculpatory record of the citizen’s conduct, in
circumstances where, otherwise, it would be the citizen’s word against the
officer’s. These are the sort of interests implicated by the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, although citizens'
right to record the police is usually analyzed under the First Amendment,
this Essay argues that there may be compelling reasons to analyze that
right under the due process clause as well.
II. DUE PROCESS AND EVIDENCE
At present, perhaps because ubiquitous audio and video recording
technology is a very recent development, there is little, if any, case law on
point. However, a due process right to record the police would represent a
logical step beyond existing law that deals with law enforcement's duty to
preserve potentially exculpatory evidence for the benefit of criminal
defendants. Such duties on the part of law enforcement are limited by the
burden that such evidence preservation might pose, but that burden is not
present where the evidence in question is gathered and preserved by
individuals. In such cases, law enforcement officers need simply do
nothing. Their  only  “burden”  would  consist  of  a  duty  not  to  interfere.
A. The Duty to Preserve Evidence
At present, police and prosecutors have a duty to turn over exculpatory
evidence to defendants when such evidence exists and when they are
aware of it.9 However, they are under no duty to preserve such evidence in
general, and absent bad faith, the destruction of such evidence is not a
violation of due process rights.10
This reading of due process has been criticized by commentators who
note that such evidence may constitute an accused's only real hope for
acquittal, and that the difficulties involved in proving bad faith on the part
9. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
10. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). See also Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad
Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 241 (2008).
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of law enforcement are almost insuperable for most defendants, resulting
in proceedings that are substantively unfair.11 But notwithstanding such
criticisms, federal courts—and many state courts—have generally been
reluctant to impose a duty to preserve evidence, worrying that such a duty
would be a tremendous burden on prosecutors and law enforcement
agencies.12 As the Supreme Court stated in Arizona v. Youngblood, “[The]  
‘fundamental fairness’ requirement of the Due Process Clause [should not
be read] . . . as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute
duty to retain and preserve all material that might be of conceivable
evidentiary   significance   in   a   particular   prosecution.”13 The Court thus
settled   on   the   “bad   faith”   test   as   a   bright-line approach, one that would
focus judicial attention on those cases where the police had misbehaved,
and where that misbehavior itself served as an indication that the
destroyed evidence had exculpatory significance.
Regardless of the merits of the bright-line approach, which has been
rejected in some states as a matter of state constitutional law, it is easy to
understand the Youngblood majority’s concern: police evidence rooms are
not unlimited in size, and if the disposal of any item might at some later
date wind up deep-sixing a case, the natural tendency to hang on to every
item would soon lead to an overflow, and problems with storage and
indexing of evidence that might themselves lead to additional problems
and injustices, as well as expense. None of these concerns, however,
applies in the context of a private citizen recording interactions with the
police.
B. A Right to Record
Unlike a duty to preserve evidence, a right to record interactions with
the police imposes no burdens on the police at all. Where someone else
does the recording, the police are being asked not to act, but to refrain
from acting. Given that photography and recording are activities to which
a liberty interest attaches,14 this difference makes a due process right to
record the police rather easy to analyze under the Supreme Cour’s
standard framework as presented in Mathews v. Eldridge.15
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Bay, supra note 10.
Id. at 255.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, quoted in Bay, supra note 10.
Glik, 655 F.3d at 87–88.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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In Eldridge, the Court held:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used; and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.16
In the context of recording the police, the analysis is straightforward.
First, the private interest here is considerable. For a citizen, every
interaction with the police is significant. Statements they make may give
rise to criminal liability, and the police may even use force—perhaps
including deadly force—as part of that encounter. An arrest as the result of
comments made (or of refusal to answer questions), even if charges are
later dropped, may lead to a significant deprivation of liberty that is
unlikely to be compensated.
Exacerbating this problem is that any conflict between the individual’s
recollection of events and the recollection of the police is likely to be
resolved in favor of the police, and in many circumstances, there may not
be independent witnesses who might resolve the question. Thus, in the
absence of such a recording, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty
would seem quite high.
A recording of the interaction, meanwhile, would seem to reduce
substantially the risk of error, both by providing a record and by
encouraging better behavior on the part of the police. (It seems unlikely,
for example, that Tiawanda Moore would have experienced the same
treatment had the officers known, or even simply feared, that they were
being recorded.)17 Likewise, the burden on the the government here is
negligible, since it is being asked merely to refrain from interfering with
citizens’  activities.
Finally, the government’s interest would seem to align with the right of
individuals to record police behavior. Individual police officers, and their
representative police unions, have obvious reasons for preferring that
16. Id. at 335.
17. Though it is beyond the scope of this brief Commentary, it is worth noting that such a right
might   also   find   penumbral   support   in   the   Sixth   Amendment’s   right   to   have   compulsory   process   for  
obtaining  witnesses  in  a  defendant’s  favor. (Thanks to Prof. Brannon Denning for this observation).
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citizens not record their encounters with law enforcement. But, from the
perspective of the government, which is concerned with justice and right
outcomes, more information, and more reliable information, is surely a
plus, rather than a minus. There might be concerns with the accuracy of
recordings, or with selective editing, but the rules of evidence should
provide adequate protections on this front, just as they do now with
security camera footage or police dash-camera video.
III. CONCLUSION
In an age of ubiquitous recording, citizens have already learned to
expect that virtually anything they do outside of their home may be
recorded by someone. Yet those recordings are usually controlled by
others who have no obligation to retain them in order to protect citizens’
rights. Under these circumstances, a due process right of citizens to record
their encounters with law enforcement (and, perhaps, other government
officials) serves to level the playing field and to protect important liberty
interests that may not always be fully protected by the First Amendment.18
At the same time, this due process right imposes no significant burdens on
government officials or on the public fisc. This being the case, there seems
no reason why courts should not find a due process right to record the
police, and many reasons why such a right should exist.
18. There is a tendency on the part of some judges to construe First Amendment protections as
involving   protection   for   the   “institutional   press,”   rather   than   protection   for   all   citizens   engaged in
publication or newsgathering. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or
for the Press as a Technology? From The Framing to Today, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 459 (2011)
(criticizing this view); see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, “Open Internet”   Proposals   and   Internet  
Activities By Ordinary Americans, testimony delivered before the Federal Communications
Commission, Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/19398968/Reynolds-FCCStatement-On-Open-Internet (also criticizing this view).
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